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 HEY, BIG SPENDER: Ethical Guidelines for 
Dispute Resolution Professionals when 
Parties Are Backed by Third-Party Funders  
Elayne E. Greenberg* 
 
A man without ethics is like a wild beast loosed upon this world. 
— Albert Camus 
INTRODUCTION 
This first-of-its-kind paper introduces ethical guidelines and suggested 
practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals when third-party 
funders provide financial backing for parties in U.S. domestic arbitrations 
and mediations.1 Sophisticated third-party funders have realized that 
litigation and dispute resolution are fast-growing, unregulated investment 
opportunities.2 Seizing these opportunities, third-party funders are now 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 * Professor Elayne E. Greenberg is Assistant Dean of Dispute Resolution, Director of the 
Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution and Professor of Legal Practice at St. John’s 
University School of Law. Thank you Dean Simons and my St. John’s colleagues for your 
encouragement. My colleagues at the AALS Alternative Dispute Resolution Section Works-in-
Progress Conference that was held at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State 
(October 20, 21 2018) raised questions that strengthened this paper. My gratitude to Victoria 
Shannon Sahani for her astute review of the final draft. My appreciation to Nicholas DiMarco (St. 
Johns Law ’19), my skilled research assistant, for his helpful comments and astute edits on this 
draft. 
 1. See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON SAHANI, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 129–74 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2017); Memorandum from Patrick 
A. Tighe, Rules Law Clerk to Ed Cooper et al. (Feb. 7, 2018), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL 
RULES, AGENDA BOOK 209, 215 (2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-
civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9EB-QL3B]. Domestically, states have taken an 
inconsistent approach regarding third-party funding as evidence by states’ statutes, case law and 
rules. Those states that have adopted any rules and regulations focus on disclosure in litigation 
and the boundaries of permissible funding arrangements. None of these rules and regulations 
address the ethical issues for dispute resolution providers and neutrals that arise when a party is 
receiving third-party funding. 
 2. See John Breslin, Funding Litigation a Billion-Dollar Business, LEGAL NEWSLINE 
(Aug. 30, 2017), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/511198462-funding-litigation-a-billion-dollar-
business [https://perma.cc/6XZH-GHJT]; Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in 
High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204226204576598842318233996 
[https://perma.cc/69VW-ATNM]. 
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making billions of dollars in profits through their strategic investments in 
domestic and global litigation and dispute resolution with few ethical rules or 
regulations to curtail their investment behavior.3 Preferring to be secretive 
about the terms of their funding contracts and invisible in their work, third-
party funders are flourishing, in large part, by operating below the regulatory 
radar.4 The funders’ behavior has been allowed to proceed invisible and 
unchecked because courts and dispute resolution providers and neutrals are 
too often unaware that a party is even receiving third-party funding. Such 
unawareness, however, presents a potential ethical minefield, not just for 
judges and litigators, but also for dispute resolution providers and neutrals. 
A discordant chorus of courts,5 business gurus6 and legal scholars, slowly 
becoming aware of the potential ethical conflicts, have begun to voice 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 3. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1; see also Matthew Andrews, The Growth of 
Litigation Finance in DOJ Whistleblower Suits: Implications and Recommendations, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2422, 2428–29 (2014) (discussing how litigation funding is a lucrative, growing industry that 
invests in a range of cases including personal injury, employment discrimination, intellectual 
property, and other commercial disputes); GEOFFREY MCGOVERN ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/
CF272.html [https://perma.cc/QA2Z-J7U7] (reporting that third-party funding is a multibillion 
dollar industry). 
 4. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 159–73 (indicating a growing minority of 
states that have statutes requiring disclosure in the litigation context); see, e.g., Maya Steinitz, 
Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1277–78 
(2011) (“In international arbitrations, the reason for this expansion [of third-party funding] is 
partly a de facto absence of professional regulations that enables funders and attorneys to operate 
outside of the disciplinary reach of bar associations.”). 
 5. Compare Alison Frankel, New York’s Top Court Clamps Down on Shoestring Litigation 
Funders, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-frankel-
litigation/new-yorks-top-court-clamps-down-on-shoestring-litigation-funders-
idUSKCN12S2M3 [https://perma.cc/36TD-APAL] (describing recent N.Y. Court of Appeals 
decision that expanded the reach of champerty), and Kevin LaCroix, Courts Throw Some Shade 
at Litigation Funding Arrangements, D&O DIARY (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2016/10/articles/litigation-%20financing-2/courts-throw-shade-litigation-funding-arrangements/ 
[https://perma.cc/CA9H-H46P] (describing cases in which funding arrangements were recently 
nullified in both Pennsylvania and Delaware), with Digging Didn’t Help—Court Decision 
Supports Commercial Litigation Funding, BENTHAM IMF (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2014/02/12/digging-didn't-
help---court-decision-supports-commercial-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/8EWV-QMEP] 
(describing recent decision in the Northern District of Illinois that held confidential 
communications between party and funder were protected by work product doctrine). 
 6. See Alison Frankel, Business Lobby Calls for Federal Rules to Require Litigation 
Funding Disclosure, REUTERS (June 2, 2017, 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-
funding-idUSKBN18T2QR [https://perma.cc/UT2R-RJE7]. More than two dozen business 
groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are advocating that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure be modified to require parties to disclose if they are backed by third-party funders. 
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concerns that third-party funders may be traversing proscribed ethical 
boundaries involving the practice of law. This growing group is calling for 
greater visibility, transparency and ethical scrutiny of third-party funding 
practice in litigation. Of course, when parties disagree, courts are the final 
arbiter of whether or not the practice of third-party funding is even legal.7 
However, once courts resolve the threshold issue of legality, there is growing 
support among the judiciary and legal community to require litigants to 
disclose if they are receiving economic support by a third-party funder.8 
Without such mandatory disclosure our legal system is unable to address the 
real and potential ethical concerns about how third-party funders are 
adversely affecting the attorney-client relationship, controlling settlement, 
and potentially posing conflicts of interest with all involved in the case. 
Until now, such heated discourse in the United States about the ethics of 
third-party funders has focused primarily on the ethics of third-party funding 
in litigation, while only cursorily addressing the ethical issues of third-party 
funders in U.S. domestic arbitration, a quasi-litigation procedure.9 Even more 
curious, the ethics of third-party funders in mediation, a party-directed 
procedure, has been conspicuously absent from the conversation. Since the 
lion’s share of legal cases are resolved by dispute resolution settlement rather 
than court judgment,10 it makes more sense that any discussion about the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 7. See AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RS55-PQK4] [hereinafter ABA 20/20 REPORT]. 
 8. See Dorothy Murray & Edmund Northcott, Thoughts on Disclosure of Third Party 
Funding, LEXOLOGY (June 20, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=d01612dd-5a78-4f8a-ae6c-22ba3c064630 [https://perma.cc/VUA6-NVM4]; Jason 
D. Russell & Hillary A. Hamilton, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Mandatory Disclosure on 
the Horizon?, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/04/thirdparty-litigation-financing-
mandatory-discl (“Recent developments indicate that courts, rule committees and even Congress 
may be leaning toward mandatory disclosure of third-party litigation funding in civil litigation.”). 
But see Sam Reisman, Critics Pushing Back on 3rd-Party Funding Disclosure Rule, LAW360 
(June 21, 2017, 7:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/935786/critics-pushing-back-on-
3rd- party-funding-disclosure-rule [https://perma.cc/WW6H-XWXZ]. 
 9. Our global brethren, however, have addressed the ethics of third-party funding in the 
context of international arbitration. This is discussed later in the section. See generally INT’L 
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON 
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2018), http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/10/40280243154551/icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A27G-P34A] [hereinafter ICCA REPORT] 
 10. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo, 
The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIG., Winter 2004, at 2 (2004), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingst
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ethical conduct of third-party funders should address the ethical conduct of 
third-party funders in those dispute resolution procedures that help promote 
settlement. The presence of a third-party funder in a dispute resolution 
procedure may collide with the ethical obligations of dispute resolution 
providers and neutrals, unless affirmative steps are taken to avoid the 
collision.11 This paper fills in that information gap, expands the evolving 
discussion about the ethics of third-party funding, and refocuses on providing 
ethical guidance for dispute resolution providers and neutrals when litigation 
funders back parties in arbitration and mediation. 
Our global brethren, who have long embraced litigation funding as an 
economic necessity to fund the escalating costs of litigation, have also begun 
to heed this warning and promulgate ethical rules to guide third-party 
funders’ behavior in dispute resolution.12 Globally, there are now legislative 
and regulatory initiatives that require greater transparency when litigation 
funders are providing financial backing for parties in international arbitration 
and mediation.13 In the United States, however, there is ambivalence about 
the legitimacy of litigation funding.14 This paper is the first proposal for 
coordinated ethical guidelines for alternative dispute resolution providers and 
neutrals to follow when third-party funders are backing parties in domestic 
arbitration and mediations. 
In order to develop responsive ethical guidelines for working with third-
party funders in dispute resolution, we must first grasp the complexities and 
nuances of third-party funders, and this paper provides that context. Part I 
chronicles the evolutionary role of third-party funders. It explains who third-
party funders are, why they were once prohibited, and the many permutations 
in which they now exist. Part II provides an overview of two global initiatives 
that provide ethical guidance when litigation funders are backing parties in a 
dispute resolution procedure. Even though global legal regimes present 
different ethical challenges, it is instructive to take the international pulse on 
this emerging issue and see which ideas can be transported to the United 
States. 
In Part III, the discussion focuses on the U.S. response to third-party 
funders by highlighting notable court decisions, the American Bar 
Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 report, and public interest 
research on this emerging topic. Part III helps identify the U.S. areas of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
atement.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9X6-QXGX] (stating that approximately 1.8% of 
federal cases were actually decided by an adjudicated decision). 
 11. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV. 405, 
426–28 (2017). 
 12. See generally ICCA REPORT, supra note 9. 
 13. See generally id. 
 14. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 157. 
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agreement and concern that need to be incorporated into any ethical 
guidelines and best practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals. 
Part IV outlines suggested ethical guidelines and best practices for dispute 
resolution providers, arbitrators, and mediators to follow when parties are 
receiving third-party funding. This discussion concludes by recognizing that 
this paper is an overdue acknowledgment that third-party funders are backing 
parties in dispute resolution procedures and a recognition that additional 
ethical issues will emerge. The reader is left with additional questions that 
the dispute resolution community may want to consider as third-party funders 
continue to play an evolving role in dispute resolution. 
I.  THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDERS 
The narrative about how third-party funding has evolved from a 
proscribed practice to an economic reality sheds light on the vestiges of 
concern about third-party funders that persist today. It also provides a 
historical context for readers to better understand the ethical concerns that 
should be addressed when third-party funders are backing a party in a dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
Historically, legal systems have had a long-standing antagonism towards 
those third parties who try to inject themselves into the litigation of others. In 
large part, courts believed that adjudication should involve only the litigants 
and the judge, and courts feared that those outsiders who attempt to inject 
themselves in these legal proceedings do so solely because they have a 
nefarious purpose that would subvert the integrity of the justice system.15 
Such a hostile intrusion was considered harmful to both the individual 
litigants and the system as a whole. As you will read, that fear was founded. 
In legal systems dating back from ancient Greek and then Roman times, there 
was a commitment to safeguard justice by barring any outsider who 
attempted to inject himself between the litigants and the judge.16 These 
outsiders took different forms. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., there 
were political clubs, known as sycophants, who would ban together and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 15. See Marc DeGirolami, On the Intellectual Origins of the Crime of Barratry, MIRROR 
JUST. (Nov. 18, 2010), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2010/11/on-the-
intellectual-origins-of-the-crime-of-barratry.html [https://perma.cc/9BNJ-NAW7] (describing 
how champerty harmed the individual client and the legal system as a whole). 
 16. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 50 (1935). There was a 
recognized primacy in the relationship between the litigants and the judge. Id. The litigant spoke 
directly to the judge. Id. Family and friends were encouraged to attend the court proceedings only 
as providers of moral support for the litigant. Id. It was considered a “serious fraud on the court” 
if a stranger attended, pretending to be a friend of the litigant. Id. 
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provoke litigation against their political adversaries.17 Similar to the Greek 
sycophant, Romans had the calumniator—those who commenced baseless 
litigation for the sole purpose of agitating the government.18 
This suspicion towards the intervention of outsiders to litigation continued 
into the Middle Ages and was codified into both the common law and old 
English statutes.19 Barratry, champerty and maintenance are the codifications 
of three categories of proscribed interference into the legal system.20 Barratry 
described the offense of those agitators who would provoke legal disputes.21 
Maintenance is the general term used to describe when an outsider to the 
litigation advances money to support an ongoing litigation without receiving 
a portion of the outcome.22 Champerty, a type of maintenance, refers to an 
outsider to the litigation who advances money to support litigation with the 
understanding that he will receive in return for his contribution, a profit or 
portion of the proceeds.23 
Over time, as legal systems strengthened their due process procedures to 
address these concerns, courts, in their wisdom, also began to realize that not 
all outsiders to litigation were a nefarious group, and that some outsiders even 
helped advance justice. Thus, a more nuanced approach to outsiders was 
warranted. In 1886, Judge Thayer in the Dahms v. Sears case opined that 
“[m]any of the evils which the law was intended to remedy have been 
overcome by countervailing circumstances that have arisen, and, in effect, 
have been extinguished.”24 With this more nuanced perspective, for example, 
it was recognized that maintenance could be re-characterized as an altruistic 
act that promotes social good by providing public interest groups needed 
funding to bring forward a worthy claim without the funders getting any 
money in return.25 Yet even today, as the following sections illustrate, 
domestic and global courts still maintain a cautious approach to third-party 
funders. Vestiges of this mistrust continue to be evidenced in our modern-
day law. Such legal doctrines as unconscionability in contract law, usury in 
consumer law and the laws regarding assignment of claims are examples of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 17. Id. at 49–51. 
 18. Id. at 53. 
 19. See id. at 57–58; see also S.J. Brooks, Champerty and Maintenance in the United States, 
3 VA. L. REV. 421, 421–22 (1916). 
 20. Brooks, supra note 19, at 421. 
 21. Id. at 423. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 425 (quoting Judge Thayer in Dahms v. Sears, 11 P. 891, 898 (Or. 1886)). 
 25. Simon Fodden, Barratry, Champerty, Maintenance, Oh My!, SLAW (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.slaw.ca/2011/09/20/barratry-champerty-maintenance-oh-my/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4K2-XV9N]. 
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continued modern-day vigilance of third-party funders’ actions.26 Fueling this 
mistrust in part is the difficulty involved in discerning who is a funder and 
whether the funder is conducting himself within the permissible bounds of 
the law. 
In its most elemental form, third-party funding involves a funding entity 
who provides financial support to a litigant in return for a share of the 
proceeds from a settlement or judgment.27 However, third-party funders come 
in many forms: banks, hedge funds or individuals or entities that provides 
funding with the expectation of profits.28 The variations that exist in different 
types of third-party funding are determinant in assessing whether the funding 
typology is legal and has a permissible business purpose.29 Furthermore, the 
characterization of a third-party funder is important, because different 
disclosure and ethical obligations attach to each characterization.30 
The contract between the funder and the litigant defines the financial 
relationship between the funder and the funded party, the funder’s role in the 
management of the case, and the allocation of responsibilities between the 
funder and funded party. Yet, third-party funders resist disclosing these 
contracts, insisting that the contracts are proprietary.31 The third-party 
funding contract varies from recourse to nonrecourse agreements.32 
Furthermore, there is no one typology of a third-party funder; consequently, 
each third-party funding agreement differs in purpose, form and context.33 
Even the name “third-party funder” may in many cases be a misnomer, 
because the funder, depending on the terms of the contract, is often not an 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 26. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 136–37, 143–44. 
 27. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-
Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 392 (2016). 
 28. Sahani, supra note 27, at 392; ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 50–51. 
 29. See Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 877–79 (2015). 
 30. Id. at 903–04. 
 31. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Blurred Lines Between Third-Party Funders and Law 
Firms, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/
11/03/blurred-lines-between-third-party-funders-and-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/E6X8-SXYH] 
(citing to an emerging financial relationship in which the third-party funder is playing a more 
active role in the case). 
 32. ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6. Recourse funding requires the funded party 
to pay the funder for the cost of money, regardless of whether the party prevails. See id. at 6. 
Nonrecourse funding requires the funded party to pay the funder only if the funded party prevails. 
Id. at 7. 
 33. See Sahani, supra note 11, at 411–12; ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 47–48. 
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actual party to the litigation.34 Therefore, disclosure about the presence of 
funders and their contractual relationship with the litigant is relevant to 
dispute resolution providers and professionals who will be facilitating the 
settlement of the case.35 
II.  GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SHAPES ETHICAL RULES AND GUIDELINES 
Our global brethren have embraced third-party funding as an economic 
necessity to fund the escalating costs of litigation and international dispute 
resolution.36 Along with such cumulative experience with third-party funders, 
however, comes a heightened awareness about the potential ethical 
minefields that may occur when third-party funders participate. This 
heightened awareness has served as the global impetus to promulgate ethical 
rules and develop best practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals 
that require greater transparency of third-party funders.37 The global 
community recognizes that without these defined boundaries, third-party 
funders, untethered by rules or regulations,38 will continue to ethically collide 
with lawyers, dispute resolution providers and neutrals, whose professional 
behaviors are defined by their respective ethical rules of conduct.39 In order 
for mediators and arbitrators to follow-through on their ethical mandates 
about disclosure of conflicts of interest and impartiality, they must first be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 34. This author met with Alan Zimmerman, CEO and Legal Counsel of Law Finance Group, 
a funding provider, on June 19, 2017. During our conversation, Mr. Zimmerman noted how the 
term “third-party funder” is not an accurate label, because funders are not a party to the litigation. 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See Third Party Funding in International Arbitration, ASHURST (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/quickguide---third-party-funding-
in-international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/DS2P-DNV4] (discussing the approaches to the 
legality of third-party funding taken by various jurisdictions, including those that embrace it, such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore, and those that have rejected it, such as Ireland); see also ICCA 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) 
(Amendment), No. 6, (2017) Cap. 609, A137, § 98 (H.K.). 
 37. See sources cited supra note 36. 
 38. See, e.g., THE ASSOCIATION OF LITIGATION FUNDERS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CODE 
OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION FUNDERS (Nov. 2011), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC+papers/Code+of+Conduct+for+Litigati
on+Funders+(November+2011).pdf [https://perma.cc/7LVC-TQF2] (providing guidelines for 
funders about adequacy of funds and accuracy of promotional literature, including the 
requirement that litigation funding agreements (“LFAs”) should include the litigation funder’s 
role in settling the case and withdrawing from the funding agreement). 
 39. CATHERINE A. ROGERS, Gamblers, Loan Sharks, and Third-Party Funders, in ETHICS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 177, 182 (2014). 
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made aware that a third-party funder with whom they have had previous 
commercial transactions is now funding a participant in the current matter.40 
This section highlights two global initiatives that are shaping the 
participatory boundaries of third-party funders in dispute resolution: the 
passage of Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation Legislation,41 
and the ICCA-Queen Mary College of the University of London Task 
Force.42 Although each initiative has different purposes, both share common 
threads. Both recognize that there needs to be disclosure about third-party 
funders in arbitration and mediation, and that failure to have disclosure will 
perpetuate ethical violations of dispute resolution tenets. Both recognize 
third-party funder is an umbrella term that describes many permeations of 
economic support, some legal and others of questionable integrity. And both 
initiatives call for greater oversight of third-party funders. 
A. Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation Legislation 
The passage of Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation 
Legislation (Third-Party Funding) (“HK Bill 2016”) on June 14, 2017, is the 
first global legislation that affirms the legitimacy of third-party funding in 
international dispute resolution.43 This legislation synchronizes Hong Kong’s 
Law on third-party funding in international dispute resolution with the 
practices of China’s International Dispute Resolution providers by 
reaffirming that the common law offenses of maintenance and champerty do 
not apply to third-party funding in international dispute resolution.44 
Significantly, HK Bill 2016 applies not only to the conduct of third-party 
funders in international arbitration, but also in international mediation.45 The 
HK Bill 2016 provides in its salient parts directives regarding the regulation 
and disclosure of third-party funders participating in arbitration and 
mediation. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 40. See Sahani, supra note 27, at 401–02. 
 41. See Cap. 609, A137, § 98. 
 42. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9. 
 43. See Bills Committee on Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) 
(Amendment) Bill 2016, LEGIS. COUNCIL H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION CHINA, 
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/bc/bc102/general/bc102.htm [https://perma.cc/B6K5-
BJUT]. See also Cap. 609, A137, § 98E(a). It is important to emphasize that this applies only to 
domestic arbitration. Third-party funding is still prohibited in Hong Kong domestic litigation.  
 44. Cap. 609, A137, § 98K; see also Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, 
supra note 36.  
 45. Cap. 609, A137, § 98F. 
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The law requires that a Code of Practice be developed that provides 
“practices and standards” for third-party funders to follow.46 The Code of 
Practice is currently in development by the HK government.47 A third-party 
funded agreement must be in writing,48 and must also explicitly state the risk 
and terms and include: 
(i) the degree of control that third party funders will have in 
relation to an arbitration [or mediation]; 
(ii) whether, and to what extent, third party funders (or persons 
associated with the third party funders) will be liable to funded 
parties for adverse costs, insurance premiums, security for costs and 
other financial liabilities; and 
(iii)  when, and on what basis, parties to funding agreements may 
terminate the funding agreements or third party funders may 
withhold arbitration funding.49 
HK Bill 2016 also provides additional mandates that should be included 
in the Code of Practice for third-party funders to ensure ethical practice. For 
example, prior to a party entering into a third-party funding agreement, third-
party funders should advise potential funded parties to consult with 
independent legal counselors before entering into the third-party funding 
agreement.50 Third-party funders are required to have a “sufficient minimum 
amount of capital.”51 Moreover, third-party funders are required to have in 
place procedures to respond to “potential, actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest,”52 and when complaints do arise, “effective procedures” and 
“meaningful remedies” to address those complaints.53 
In large part, Hong Kong enacted this groundbreaking legislation to 
reinforce Hong Kong’s stature as a leading center for international dispute 
resolution in the Asia-Pacific region.54 The impact of this legislation is not 
limited to China, but rather establishes regulation and disclosure standards 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 46. Id. § 98P. 
 47. Joseph Chung, Draft Code of Practice for Third Party Funding of Arbitration and 
Mediation, DEACONS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.deacons.com.hk/news-and-
insights/publications/draft-code-of-practice-for-third-party-funding-of-arbitration-and-
mediation.html [https://perma.cc/KY7X-FF7G]. 
 48. Cap. 609, A137, § 98H. 
 49. Id. § 98Q(1)(b). 
 50. Id. § 98Q(1)(c). 
 51. Id. § 98Q(1)(e). 
 52. Id. § 98Q(1)(f). 
 53. Id. § 98Q(1)(g). 
 54. LEGIS. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE BILLS COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
LEGISLATION (THIRD PATY FUNDING) (AMENDMENT), No. CB(4)1161/16-17, ¶ 8 (2016) (H.K.). 
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concerning third-party funders that can help shape the ethical contours of 
third-party funding in global dispute resolution.55 
B. ICCA Report Addresses the Ethical Issues Presented by Third-Party 
Funders in International Arbitration 
 
In 2013, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (“ICCA”) 
in collaboration with the Queen Mary College of the University of London 
formed a Task Force to provide “greater understanding about what third-party 
funding is and . . . the issues it raises in international arbitration.”56 In large 
part, the Task Force came together to address the reality that litigation funders 
were investing in international arbitration because such arbitrations were of 
high value and offered little opportunity for appeal.57 Furthermore, there was 
concern that funders are able to structure their funding agreements by 
choosing choices of law and forums to avoid scrutiny of their investing 
practices.58 In April 2018, the Task Force issued a Report on its findings.59 
In order to accommodate “the range of existing third-party funding 
models” and anticipate new developments, the Report adopted a broad 
working definition of third-party funders and funding.60 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 55. See Singapore Civil Law Act (Chapter 43) Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 
2017, c. 43, § 68. The Singapore Law followed on the heels of the Hong Kong Law, as each center 
tried to gain control of the international arbitration and mediation market. It is important to note 
that Singapore, like Hong Kong, does not permit third-party funding in domestic Singaporean 
courts. See Third Party Funding of Arbitration in Singapore and Hong Kong: A Comparison, 
ASHURST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/third-
party-funding-of-arbitration-in-singapore-and-hong-kong-a-comparison/ 
[https://perma.cc/XQC3-UG7W]. 
 56. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 3; see also id. at 7 (describing the scope of the Task 
Force’s work to include “analysis of specific issues that directly affect international arbitration 
proceedings and are capable of being addressed at an international level (i.e., conflicts of interest, 
privilege, and costs and security for costs)”). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 4 (“Since the Task Force was initially constituted in 2013 . . . . The 
funding market has expanded in several respects. The number of funded cases has increased 
significantly. The number and geographic diversity of third-party funders has also increased, with 
new entities continuing to enter the market and consequently increase the aggregate amounts 
available for funding.”); see also id. at 25–27 (discussing the economics and return structures of 
third-party funding). 
 58. See Rebecca Mulder & Marc Krestin, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: 
To Regulate or Not to Regulate?, YOUNG ICCA BLOG (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.youngicca-
blog.com/third-party-funding-in-international-arbitration-to-regulate-or-not-to-regulate/ 
[https://perma.cc/XW7A-73YJ]. 
 59. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at i. 
 60. Id. at 50. 
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The Report defines “third-party funding” as: 
[A]n agreement by an entity that is not a party to the dispute to 
provide a party, an affiliate of that party or a law firm representing 
that party, 
a) funds or other material support in order to finance part or all of 
the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a specific 
range of cases, and 
b) such support or financing is either provided in exchange for 
remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially dependent 
on the outcome of the dispute, or provided through a grant or in 
return for a premium payment.61 
It goes on to define a third-party funder as: 
[A]ny natural or legal person who is not a party to the dispute but 
who enters into an agreement either with a party, an affiliate of that 
party, or a law firm representing that party: 
a) in order to provide material support for or to finance part or all of 
the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a specific 
range of cases, and 
b) such support or financing is either provided in exchange for 
remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially dependent 
on the outcome of the dispute, or provided through a grant or in 
return for a premium payment.62 
 
In addition to the working definitions, the Task Force addressed four 
ethical issues that are raised when third-party funders provide support in 
international arbitration: (1) the potential conflicts of interest between the 
arbitrator and third-party funder; (2) how sharing information with a third-
party funder might affect the attorney-client privilege; (3) whether there is a 
need for third-party funding to provide security for costs; and (4) how the 
presence of a third-party funder affects the allocation of costs.63 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 61. Id. See also id. at 56–70 for a survey of existing definitions. 
 62. Id. at 50. 
 63. Id. at 12. 
51:0131]    ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 143 
1. Conflicts of Interest Between the Arbitrator and Third-Party 
Funder64 
The Report recognizes that the international arbitration community has 
become an insular club in which third-party funders, attorneys and arbitrators 
have ongoing contact.65 Contributing to this insularity, attorneys on one case 
may switch hats and serve as an arbitrator on another case.66 Adding to this 
insularity, third-party funders are increasingly tapping experienced attorney 
from this pool to work for the funders and serve on their advisory boards.67 
Despite some disagreement, the Report proposed “systematic disclosure” 
because “disclosure by the funded party of the existence and identity of 
funders is necessary so that arbitrators [can] make appropriate disclosures 
and decisions regarding potential conflicts of interest.”68 Accordingly, the 
Report calls for parties to “disclose the existence of a third-party funding 
arrangement and the identity of the funder to the arbitrator . . . as part of a 
first appearance . . . or as soon as practicable.”69 This proposal is “in keeping 
with global trends in regulation of third-party funding,” consistent with an 
ICCA survey that found broad support for disclosure of third-party funding 
arrangements and funders,70 and recognizes the many potential conflicts 
between arbitrators and funders that could arise in several circumstances.71 
Colleagues in the arbitrator’s law firm might be working with the third-party 
funder on another matter.72 In another example, the arbitrator could be the 
arbitrator on a case funded by the third-party funder, and then counsel on 
another case funded by the same third-party funder.73 Without disclosure of 
these conflicts, the arbitrator’s impartiality and commitment to maintaining 
an international arbitration of integrity would be called into question.74 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 64. Id. at 63, 81–115 (discussing the revision of the International Bar Association (IBA) 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest). 
 65. See id. at 82. 
 66. See Jennifer A. Trusz, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest Arising from Third-Party 
Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 GEO. L.J. 1649, 1669–71 (2013). 
 67. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 82. 
 68. Id. at 83. 
 69. Id. at 81.  
 70. Id. at 83.  
 71. Id. at 82. 
 72. See id. at 111. 
 73. Id. at 112. 
 74. See id. at 87. 
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2. Confidentiality and Attorney Client-Privilege75 
Prior to deciding to fund a case, third-party funders gather information 
from the attorney and client to assess the viability of funding that case.76 Is 
the sharing of that information done so in a way that waives the attorney-
client privilege or is it done so in a way that protects the attorney-client 
privilege? As the Report notes, “[t]he rise of third-party funding has added 
new complexities to existing ambiguities about privilege in international 
arbitration.”77 The Report identifies three categories of information that 
implicate these complexities.78 The first category is privileged information 
that is provided to a third-party at the “initial due diligence phase”79 and after 
it has committed to funding the party.80 The second category involves the 
funding agreement itself.81 The final category includes documents produced 
and held by the funder, such as the funder’s assessment of the case, 
“documents relating to the negotiation of the funding agreement,” and legal 
opinions on the strength of the case generated by the funder.82 
The Report takes the position that the “existence of funding and the 
identity of a third-party funder is not subject to any legal privilege.”83 The 
specific provisions of a funding agreement, on the other hand, “may be 
subject to confidentiality obligations . . . and may include information that is 
subject to a legal privilege.”84 Production of these specific provisions should 
be ordered by the arbitral tribunal only “in exceptional circumstances.”85 
Finally, on the question of waiver, the Report states that the mere fact that 
privileged information is furnished to a third-party funder should not waive 
the privilege, so long as the information was provided “for the purpose of 
obtaining funding or supporting the funding relationship.”86 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 75. Id. at 117. 
 76. See id.  
 77. Id. at 118. 
 78. Id. at 118–19. 
 79. Id. at 118. The Report describes that phase as “where funding is first requested and the 
third-party funder requires information in order to decide whether or not to provide financing.” 
Id. 
 80. Id. at 119. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 117. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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3. Allocation of Costs and Security of Costs87 
The Report also examined how to respond to security of cost applications 
at the beginning of the arbitration and applications for allocation of costs at 
the end of the arbitration when one or both parties are funded by a third-party 
funder.88 
As mentioned in the introduction of this article, the global legal regimes 
are different than the U.S. legal system. One glaring difference is that the 
English rule requires the losing party in litigation to pay the winner’s 
attorney’s fees, while the American rule followed in the United States 
requires each party to be responsible for its respective legal fees.89 In 
arbitration, however, arbitrators may award costs in a different proportion 
than the “all or nothing” English rule would suggest.90 In another departure 
from the distinction between the American and English rule, the Federal 
Arbitration Act provides that U.S. domestic arbitrators may enforce 
international arbitration awards that allocate costs in a manner different than 
the American rule.91 Thus, some of the advances cannot be transported 
wholesale because of these differences. 
However, these initiatives can also generate ideas about what should be 
included in U.S. ethical guidelines for dispute resolution providers and 
neutrals. Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) providers and neutrals 
should consider requiring disclosure of third-party funding of a party 
participating in arbitration and mediation. Another consideration is what 
information can be shared with the other party because the attorney-client 
privilege has been waived and what information remains privileged. In 
another example, the awarding of third-party funding costs as part of the 
arbitration award may be one global practice that may be transported to the 
United States and have ethical ramifications.92 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 87. Id. at 146. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on 
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327 
(2013).  
 90. See Counting the Costs of Arbitration, BIRD & BIRD (Dec. 2005), 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2005/counting-the-cost-of-arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/7YYP-PWEG]. 
 91. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2018).  
 92. See John Fellas, Can Arbitrators Award Third-Party Funding Costs in International 
Arbitration?, N.Y. L.J. (June 30, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4b4d371e-
8751-4f20-8d3a-331c417074e4/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/ST4Q-TZ3T] (explaining 
how cost-shifting, in which the arbitrator orders the losing party to pay the costs of the prevailing 
party, is part of international arbitration. Litigation funding is now an included part of those costs. 
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III.  IN THE UNITED STATES, A SLOWER PULSE 
In contrast to the welcome global embrace for third-party funders, the 
United States has maintained an ambivalent and cautious approach towards 
third-party funding. Domestically, U.S. courts have divided on the legality 
of third-party funders.93 Some courts have abandoned barratry, champerty and 
maintenance, while other courts still rely on these prohibitions to help define 
permissible outsider conduct.94 To this day, courts still frown upon those 
outsiders to litigation such as third-party funders who instigate, control, 
fund, and profit from litigation to which they are not a party.95 The litigant-
judge relationship remains sacrosanct.96 One reason proffered for the U.S.’s 
hesitance about third-party funding is a long-held value that one shouldn’t 
profit from another’s harm.97 This section will provide a snapshot of the 
U.S.’s reaction by highlighting three spheres of influence that are shaping 
the U.S.’s response to third-party funding: the courts, the American Bar 
Association, and public interest groups such as the Rand Institute and the 
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. 
A. Survey of Court Responses 
The U.S. courts have had a range of responses to third-party funders from 
acceptance,98 conditional acceptance,99 to outright rejection of the concept.100 
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.101 is an instructive case that highlights the 
layers of confidentiality issues raised by the presence of third-party funders. 
As a threshold issue, the court found that litigation funding is legal in Illinois, 
because the doctrines of maintenance and champerty “have been narrowed to 
a filament.”102 Moreover, the purpose of the funding in the case at bar was 
not “to promote strife or contention,” but to provide needed economic 
backing to advance the party’s claim.103 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Mr. Fellas posits that the Federal Arbitration Act could also be interpreted to mean that costs 
include the cost of litigation funders.). 
 93. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 9–12; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 11–
12, 129 (discussing contemporary U.S. domestic court responses to third-party funding). 
 94. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 95. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 23. 
 96. See id. at 10–11. 
 97. Id. at 23. 
 98. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 9–12. 
 99. See Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. 2016).  
 100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 677–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 101. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 102. Id. at 727. 
 103. Id. at 726. 
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Instructive to our discussion, the court explained analogizing third-party 
funding to insurance is an inaccurate comparison because litigation funding 
and insurance each create distinct financial relationships: “Abraham Lincoln 
once was asked how many legs a donkey has if you call its tail a leg. His 
answer was four: calling a tail a leg does not make it one.”104 With insurance, 
the relationship between insurer and insured is one of indemnification. The 
insurance company, as the subrogee, is “limited to reimbursement for what it 
paid its insured and no more.”105 In contradistinction, the relationship 
between a litigation funder and the party it funds is limited by the amount of 
funds the litigation funder has agreed to loan the fundee. The funder is not a 
subrogee and will not pay for the fundee’s losses or indemnify the funder.106  
The court also addressed whether privileged attorney-client information 
shared with a third-party funder waived that confidentiality privilege or 
remained privileged because the third-party funder shared a “common 
interest in the successful outcome of the litigation.”107 The court opined the 
sharing of information with litigation funders was not protected by the 
common interest doctrine, because the relationship was about money, not 
legal strategies or opinions.108 However, the court found that even though the 
information shared with the third-party funder was not protected by the 
“common interest” doctrine, it was protected by the confidentiality agreement 
that was signed by the funder prior to receiving the privileged information.109 
B. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
The American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 Information 
Report to the House of Delegates (the “ABA 20/20 Report”) focuses on how 
the third-party funders might ethically compromise the attorney-client 
relationship.110 The Commission cautioned about potential ethical threats to 
lawyers’ professional responsibilities in three areas. First, the lawyer should 
ensure that any third-party funding agreement or relationship does not 
compromise or disincentivize the lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment in the attorney-client relationship.111 Thus, lawyers should avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 104. Id. at 729. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 731–35. 
 108. Id. at 732–34. 
 109. See id. at 736–39. 
 110. ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 15–29. 
 111. Id. at 22. 
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third-party funding agreements that attempt to overtake control of the case.112 
Second, the lawyer should take care that when the client or lawyer share 
privileged information protected by the attorney-client privilege with the 
third-party funder, the lawyer should take steps to protect that 
confidentiality.113 Third, the lawyer should have an adequate understanding 
of how third-party funders work so that the lawyer may inform and counsel 
the client about any potential risks associated working with funders.114 
Of particular interest to dispute resolution neutrals, the Commission raised 
that a contractual obligation with a third-party funder might influence a 
party’s decision-making process regarding settlement.115 Some agreements 
with third-party funders explicitly state that the funder has to approve the 
settlement.116 Yet, even if the contractual agreement is silent on this point, the 
funded party may “implicitly” consider the funded amount in assessing 
whether the settlement number is adequate.117 
The Commission recognized that because there are so many variations of 
third-party funding agreements, it is challenging to identify all the possible 
ethical issues for lawyers that may arise from these different permeations.118 
Moreover, as third-party funders continue to evolve and offer different types 
of financial support, new ethical challenges could emerge.119 The 
Commission reinforced that the client, as a matter of agency law, has a right 
to delegate revocable settlement authority to other agents such as a third-party 
funder.120 However, any agreement with a third-party funder should not 
interfere with a client’s option of terminating the lawyer-client relationship 
at any time.121 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 112. Id. at 21. 
 113. Id. at 30. 
 114. Id. at 38. 
 115. Id. at 27. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 28. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. Id. at 27. 
 121. Id. at 16. 
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C. Public Interest Research 
1. The Rand Report—Third Party Litigation Funding122 
In 2009, the UCLA-RAND Center for Law and Policy convened Third-
Party Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer: Trends and Implications for 
the Civil Justice System (the “Rand Report”), the first U.S. symposium on 
third-party funding.123 Bringing together representatives from the business, 
legal, academic, and not-for-profit communities, the group investigated how 
third-party funding will impact the civil justice system.124 The group did not 
anticipate that third-party funders would provoke a rise in frivolous cases.125 
Rather, the group concluded that more research was needed on whether third-
party funders could use risk analysis to identify and support more meritorious 
cases.126 The group discussed the ethical concerns raised by third-party 
funders such as the confidentiality issues in the lawyer-client relationship.127 
Participants expressed that there exists sufficient elasticity in the existing 
ethical rules to accommodate these ethical concerns.128 
In a noteworthy follow-up to the 2009 Rand Report, Steven Garber 
examined the economic, legal, and ethical issues related to third-party 
financing in the United States,129 in particular its possible effects on the 
likelihood and timing of settlements.130 First, Garber recognizes that 
disclosure of the mere existence of third-party funding may make the 
defendant more inclined to settle.131 This is because “a defendant who knows 
that the plaintiff has [funding] may infer from the existence of [such funding] 
that the legal claim has legal merit or high economic value . . . .”132 Second, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 122. The Rand Corporation is a non-profit research organization which “is dedicated to 
making the civil justice system more efficient and more equitable.” Rand Institute for Civil 
Justice, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy/civil-justice.html 
[http://perma.cc/4YPC-QL87] (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).  
 123. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
 124. Id. at iii. 
 125. Id. at 20. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 16. 
 128. Id. at 17. 
 129. See generally STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/
2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK5V-BJEX]. 
 130. Id. at 32. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Garber notes that this scenario is most plausible in the context of investments in 
commercial claims, however, because third-party funders in this context have rigorous claim-
assessment procedures. Id. at 33. 
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Garber reasons that “the existence of a non-recourse loan to a plaintiff could 
impede settlements both early and late in the life of the underlying lawsuit, 
but promote settlements during a period of time in between.”133 
2. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform134 
The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, a non-profit affiliate of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and an advocacy group to promote civil justice 
reform, has taken on the issue of third-party funding.135 Unlike the Rand 
Report, which offers a cautiously accepting approach to third-party funding, 
the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform has been banging the drums and 
warning that “the sky is falling” unless our legal system takes affirmative 
steps to protect against the “parade of horribles” that third-party funders may 
cause.136 The Chamber warns that unchecked, third-party funders will 
promote frivolous litigation.137 In a passionate letter joined by over two dozen 
other business organizations, the Chamber has also called for a revision of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require that parties disclose in all civil 
cases when they receive backing from third-party funders.138 
Although the Civil Rules Committee has yet to revise the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the concerns raised by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform have been heeded. On January 17, 2017, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California required that parties in class actions must 
disclose whether they are receiving funding.139 In an even bolder action, on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 133. Id. 
 134. JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, 
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7WUH-P4KZ]. 
 135. About ILR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr [https://perma.cc/9YQN-2J2C] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2018). 
 136. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 134, at 4–5. 
 137. Id. at 5–7. 
 138. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has considered such a proposed 
amendment, once in 2014 and again in 2016. Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (Dec. 6, 2017), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 235, 247–
51, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-01-standing-agenda-book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5TJ-VMHF]. On both occasions, the committee concluded that the topic was 
not “ripe.” Id. at 247. 
 139. See Standing Order for All Judges of the Northern District of California, Contents of 
Joint Case Management Statement ¶ 19 (Nov. 1, 2018), https://cand.uscourts.gov/whaorders 
[https://perma.cc/Q9EL-4KJF]; Memorandum from Patrick A. Tighe, supra note 1, at 211. 
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April 3, 2018, Wisconsin enacted Wisconsin Act 235,140 becoming the first 
state to require litigants in civil actions to disclose their litigation funding 
agreements whether or not they are asked to do so.141 Then on April 10, 2018, 
the Civil Rules Committee issued a 50-state survey regarding third party-
funding disclosure.142 
Thus, even though the United States retains a cautionary approach to third-
party funders, some states are recognizing the importance of disclosure and 
are beginning to enact statutes and court rules compelling disclosure.143 The 
U.S. courts, however, have yet to reach consensus on the legality of third-
party funders. The not-for-profits groups who have researched how litigation 
funders might impact litigation have focused their efforts on amplifying their 
concerns about how third-party funding could potentially erode the fabric of 
our justice system. However, while these well-intentioned organizations 
continue to pontificate about their concerns regarding third-party funders, the 
funders continue to participate in such dispute resolution processes as 
mediation and arbitration, invisible and unregulated. The next Part 
incorporates the expressed concern and advances the discussion by 
suggesting affirmative steps that should be taken by dispute resolution 
providers and neutrals to address the ethical concerns presented by third-party 
funders’ participation in dispute resolution. 
IV.  PROPOSED ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVIDERS, ARBITRATORS, AND MEDIATORS 
In this Part, I offer ethical guidelines and best practice suggestions for 
ADR providers,144 arbitrators, and mediators so that the dispute resolution 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 140. WIS. STAT. § 804.01(2)(bg) (2018). 
 141. Expectedly, supporters of disclosure applauded this legislation while litigation funders 
voiced concerns that this legislation did not distinguish between disclosure requirements for 
consumer and commercial cases. Jamie Hwang, Wisconsin Law Requires All Litigation Funding 
Arrangements to Be Disclosed, A.B.A. J.: DAILY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wisconsin_law_requires_all_litigation_funding_arrang
ements_to_be_disclosed/ [https://perma.cc/3DMY-29XY]. While third-party funders have 
accepted disclosure as part of international practice, third-party funders continue to push back 
about efforts to require disclosure in the U.S. See, e.g., Mandatory Disclosure of Funders Would 
Further Clog Overburdened Court Dockets, BENTHAM IMF (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2018/06/13/mandatory-
disclosure-of-funders-would-further-clog-overburdened-court-dockets [https://perma.cc/G8PV-
ULCT]. 
 142. Tighe, supra note 1, at 209–29.  
 143. See id. 
 144. See generally CPR–GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 
IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2002), https://www.cpradr.org/
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profession may more responsively address the real and apparent ethical 
issues that arise when a third-party funder backs a party who is participating 
in a dispute resolution procedure.145 The time has come for dispute 
resolution providers and neutrals to acknowledge the reality of third-party 
funding, take affirmative steps to maintain the integrity of dispute resolution 
practices, and consider the potential benefits third- party funders bring to 
settlement. Some observe and others ignore the reality that third-party 
funders are proliferating and backing participating parties in our arbitrations 
and mediations with greater frequency. This ignorance is untenable, for the 
presence of third-party funders that provide financial backing to dispute 
resolution parties may at times challenge the ethical obligations of dispute 
resolution providers and neutrals. 
An overarching interest of dispute resolution providers, arbitrators, and 
mediators when parties are backed by third-party funders is to obtain 
adequate relevant information about third-party funders so that ADR 
professionals can ensure that the dispute resolution process and any resulting 
settlement are procedurally and substantively fair and just.146 In order to 
address this overarching interest, I offer three suggestions. First, dispute 
resolution providers and neutrals should require titrated disclosure about 
the relationship between the third-party funder and the party. Second, 
neutrals must be educated about how to work with third-party funders when 
they are backing any of the participating parties. Third, dispute resolution 
intake procedures, promotional materials, contracting forms, and other 
required paperwork need to be modified to gather relevant information about 
the third-party funder. I first explain these general suggestions and then tailor 
the application of each of these suggestions to the three different groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
resource-center/protocols-guidelines/ethics-codes/principles-for-adr-provider-organizations/
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Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 504–05 (1991). 
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A. Proposal One: Titrated and Sequential Disclosure About the 
Relationship Between the Third-Party Funder and Party 
Disclosure remains a hotly contested and nuanced issue in which third-
party funders tenaciously advocate for confidentiality of their contracting 
relationship with the party while those purveyors of justice, many untrusting 
of third-party funders, are demanding disclosure so that there is total 
transparency. Disclosure is not an all or nothing proposition; rather, it is a 
nuanced term that embraces what is disclosed, to whom disclosure is made, 
whether the information disclosed remains confidential, and at what phase of 
the dispute resolution procedure the information is to be disclosed. 
Acknowledging the apprehensions raised by third-party funders about 
disclosure and the dispute resolution profession’s need for quality disclosure 
about third-party funders, I recommend that disclosure should be sequentially 
titrated and tailored to the different phases of the dispute resolution 
procedures. The information that is required to be disclosed should be based 
on the informational needs warranted at different phases of the given dispute 
resolution procedure. Moreover, such sequential, titrated disclosure helps 
avoid broad disclosure about the third-party funder in those instances when 
parties are not going forward with the dispute resolution procedure, or the 
information is not necessary. 
1. Three Levels of Sequential Disclosure During the Contracting 
Phase of Arbitration and the Pre-Mediation Phase 
a. Recommended Disclosure Level One 
In the initial contracting phase between a party and the dispute 
resolution provider, arbitrator or mediator, disclosure about third-party 
funders should be limited to whether or not there is a third-party funder, and 
if there is, the names of those in the funder’s organization. The rationale for 
disclosing the identity of the third-party funder is to ferret out early on in the 
dispute resolution process any potential conflicts that may exist between the 
third-party funder and the neutral.147 
If there is a conflict, an ancillary issue that needs to be addressed at this 
phase is whether the conflict between the third-party funder and the neutral is 
a waivable one that first needs to be disclosed to the other party or is deemed 
to be a conflict that is not waivable. If those involved want the opportunity 
to waive the conflict, the identity and relationship of the funder must also 
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be shared with the other party involved in the matter. Identifying conflicts 
doesn’t necessarily mean disqualification. Customarily, when there is a 
conflict, conflicts can be waived at the consent of the parties.148 Dispute 
resolution providers and neutrals can incorporate this level of disclosure into 
the existing conflict procedures used. 
Another option is for dispute resolution providers to institute a per se rule 
that conflicts between the neutral and third-party funders cannot be waived. 
In that case, the identity of the third-party funder does not have to be 
disclosed. Dispute resolution professionals and providers have to decide on 
the rule they will choose to incorporate as part of their practice, and then 
notify parties about this rule. 
I offer a cautionary note about considering the second option and 
instituting a per se ban on waiving conflicts. While some dispute resolution 
communities are large and have many dispute resolution professionals from 
which to select a neutral, some dispute resolution practice communities are 
insular and just have a finite number of neutrals. In those instances, it is 
common that arbitrations and mediations involve the same people, just 
wearing different hats. In those cases, neutrals and providers may want to 
consider the ramifications of making conflicts between neutrals and third-
party funders conflicts that can’t be waived. 
b. Recommended Disclosure Level Two 
Once conflicts between the third-party funder and neutral are addressed 
and it is decided that the parties wish to proceed with the dispute resolution 
procedure, an additional level of disclosure that clarifies the relationship 
between the third-party funder and participant needs to be made at the 
contracting phase. The importance of such disclosure is to allow the dispute 
resolution provider, arbitrator, and mediator to discern if the third-party 
funder is actually a party to the dispute resolution procedure. Of course, 
determining whether or not a funder is a party is controversial and is a label 
that third-party funders prefer to avoid.149 However, our primary concern 
is to maintain the integrity of our dispute resolution procedures. Therefore, 
dispute resolution providers, arbitrators, and mediators must have knowledge 
of all the parties who are influencing and shaping the resolution of the 
dispute. 
If the third-party funder is a party, then what is its level of participation in 
the dispute resolution procedure and the concomitant obligations that come 
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 149. NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 47–48 discusses whether third-party funding is 
characterized as a loan subjecting it to usury laws versus a loan. 
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with that participation? For example, if the third-party funder is funding a 
party in mediation, shouldn’t that third-party funder also be required to sign a 
confidentiality agreement protecting the confidentiality of mediation 
communications? In another example, if a party is to proceed to agreement 
and the party’s funding agreement shows that the third-party funder is 
actually now a party, should the third-party funder be required to participate 
in the arbitration? 
i) Disclosure raises concomitant confidentiality issues if the third-party 
funder participates in mediation and arbitration. 
 
An important sub-issue that should also be addressed when clarifying the 
relationship between the third-party funder and the party is clarifying which 
information that the lawyer and party shared with the third-party funder 
remains confidential as part of the attorney-client privilege and which 
information was shared in a way that waives the privilege. Whether or not the 
information that is shared with a third-party funder is done so in a way that 
waives or protects the attorney-client privilege has procedural implications 
in mediation and procedural and evidentiary implications in arbitration. 
When it is disclosed that a third-party funder is backing a mediation party, 
that relationship raises three issues about mediation confidentiality that 
dispute resolution professionals need to address to preserve the integrity of 
mediation. A threshold issue that dispute resolution professionals need to 
clarify is how the third-party funder should be characterized. This 
professional characterization is important, because depending on the 
characterization of the third-party funder, different confidentiality concerns 
have to be resolved. For example, if a third-party funder learns in the course 
of a mediation confidential information about the other party that could give 
the third-party funder a trading advantage, the third-party funder should be 
barred from trading on that information. The second issue to be addressed is 
whether the dispute resolution party will communicate with the funder about 
mediation communications, and because there is an expectation by all 
mediation participants that the mediation communications are to remain 
confidential, should the third-party funder be compelled to also sign a 
confidentiality agreement or should the confidentiality agreement be 
amended so that it allows the dispute resolution party to consult with the 
third-party funders as one of its experts? So in mediation, if the participating 
party has a contractual relationship with the third-party funder that requires 
sharing of information, consultation, and direction as the case progresses, 
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then the mediator should also have the third-party funder sign a 
confidentiality agreement to protect mediation confidentiality.150 
If the third-party funder happens to also be a hedge fund, extra mediation 
confidentiality protections are needed to protect mediation confidentiality 
and prevent insider training. We learn from bankruptcy mediations in which 
hedge funds participate that added ethical screens/walls are needed to secure 
the mediation communications.151 Another wrinkle that dispute resolution 
professionals need to address is that hedge funds that are also third-party 
funders might learn confidential information in the mediation about the other 
party that the hedge fund uses to trade on.152 
Unlike mediation, in arbitration, the arbitrator makes determinations 
and issues awards based on the evidence presented.153 Therefore, it is 
important to ascertain whether information shared with the third-party funder 
is done so in a way that protects or waives the attorney-client privilege. 
c. Recommended Disclosure Level Three 
A third level of disclosure that may be necessary is the financial 
relationship between the third-party funder and the funded party. Although 
this information may be needed in both arbitration and mediation, the 
information is needed in each dispute resolution procedure for different 
reasons. In arbitration, the information may be needed either to assess the 
costs one party incurred to go forward with the arbitration or to ensure that 
the third-party funder has sufficient funds to follow-through on his funding 
obligations. The decision about when this disclosure should take place is 
context specific. For example, if the other party makes a motion at the 
beginning of the arbitration for a bond of sufficiency, then that information 
needs to be provided at the beginning of the arbitration process. However, if 
no such motion is made, then the request for such information might not be 
made until the end of the arbitration when the neutral needs to be informed 
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about the actual costs, including the cost of third-party funding, that the party 
has incurred.154 
In mediation, the information might be helpful to assess each party’s 
commitment to yield a just result or to better understand the economics of a 
party’s decision or ambivalence about settlement. Here again, the timing of 
the disclosure will be based on when this informational need arises. As one 
illustration, if a party needs to reimburse a third-party funder the borrowed 
amount, interest on that amount and an exponential return on any amount 
recovered, the party may be reluctant to accept what appears to the mediator, 
a reasonable settlement. Only when the party discloses the financial 
obligations to the funder might a mediator better understand the impasse 
and be able work with the parties in a more realistic way. 
d. Recommended Disclosure Level Four 
A fourth level of disclosure is the sharing of the third-party funder’s 
objective assessment of the case. Because of their ability to create a matrix 
of information about the merits of the case with admirable objectivity, third-
party funders are often considered to be super lawyers. Like other experts 
that are often part of arbitration and mediation processes, funders can be 
invited to share their analysis of the case, to provide evidence in the arbitration 
or to help address impasses in mediation. To date, third-party funders have 
resisted sharing their analysis of a case, insisting that their method of 
assessing whether a case is investment worthy is proprietary, and not to be 
shared with others. Going forward, however, as the push for greater 
transparency on the part of third-party funders gains momentum, dispute 
resolution professionals will have to work with third-party funders, as they 
work with other experts, to have third-party funders share their case analysis 
without disclosing all their proprietary methods. 
B. Proposal Two: Training for ADR Providers, Arbitrators, and 
Mediators 
Professional dispute resolution training programs should be expanded 
to include education about the additional skills neutrals need to work with 
those parties backed by third-party funders. As was mentioned in the 
introduction of this paper, many dispute resolution professionals and 
providers are unaware that parties are backed by third-party funders even 
though increasing numbers of parties are receiving dispute funding. Yet, as 
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this article has explained, such unawareness is creating an ethical minefield 
that potentially undermines the integrity of dispute resolution. Thus, a 
specialized training module is needed to heighten a neutral’s awareness about 
third-party funders and to provide neutrals with the requisite skills needed to 
maintain a dispute resolution process of integrity. 
The contents of such an additional training module should include the 
ethical issues that neutrals need to address when parties are funded; how to 
modify intake and process procedures to ferret out the existence of third-
party funders; how to implement titrated levels of disclosure; strategies to 
help neutrals manage their own cognitive biases about third-party funders; 
how to incorporate the third-party funder’s assessment of the case into the 
process; and skills to manage parties’ own biases about third-party funders. 
At this time, those ADR providers and trainers who are ahead of the curve 
and wish to develop a responsive training for neutrals will find more 
questions raised than answers provided. The scholarship surrounding third-
party funding, to date, has centered on the ethics of the practice and the 
question of disclosure. The specifics of how disclosure of third-party funders 
might actually influence the dynamics with the neutral and participants, 
however, remain an unexplored area. In Part V of this paper, I raise these 
emerging questions and posit the possible dynamic shifts that third-party 
funders might spark arbitration and mediation. 
V.  HOW MIGHT DISCLOSURE IMPACT THE DYNAMICS OF THE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCESS  
Once one or both parties disclose that they are receiving dispute funding, 
any conflicts emerging from that disclosure are addressed, and the dispute 
resolution process proceeds, the disclosure itself could also potentially 
shape the decision-making process of the neutrals and parties involved. 
Although there is no specific research on point, cognitive psychologists 
provide us with insights about how arbitrators, mediators, and disputants 
might be influenced by the knowledge that a dispute is receiving third-party 
funding.155 Biases about third-party funding, the amount of funding that a 
party is receiving, and the terms of the funding agreement may all influence 
the dynamics in both arbitration and mediation. 
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A. Explicit and Implicit Bias About Third-Party Funding 
Even though arbitrators and mediators are ethically mandated to be 
impartial,156 they are also human beings who may have pre-existing ideas 
about the ethics of third-party funding. These pre-existing ideas or biases 
may cause the neutral to be explicitly or implicitly biased for or against third-
party funders.157 As with many biases, such bias could be formed and 
reinforced by the self-selected media and publications that the neutral has 
been exposed to about third-party funders.158 For example, if a neutral is 
following the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform’s concerted efforts 
to disallow third-party funders from operating “in the shadows,” the neutral 
might be leery of funders.159 However, if a neutral is enthusiastically 
following the success of hedge funds who are funding litigation, then the 
neutral might view funders more favorably. 
Such biases, whether explicit or implicit, favorable or unfavorable, 
might influence how neutrals deviate from their ethical mandate of 
impartiality. Depending on the bias of the neutral, the neutral might then 
interpret the fact that a party is funded as an indication that the case at hand 
has enough merit to warrant investment or just an indication that the party 
needed money. Depending on the bias of the neutral, the neutral may 
consider the fact that a party is funded either as an indication of the level of 
commitment of the parties to go forward with the case or a vengeful step to 
drag the case on unnecessarily. 
Cognitive psychologists explain that our biases are more likely to emerge 
in ambiguous situations where there are fewer rules to follow.160 Thus, even 
though mediators and arbitrators might both be influenced by their biases 
about third-party funders, mediators might be more likely to be influenced 
by such bias.161 The structure of the mediation process is more flexible and 
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has less defined procedures than the arbitration process. For example, 
mediation may be conducted in joint meetings, private caucuses, or a 
combination of the two. Although the mediation parties, not the mediator, 
have the ultimate decision-making power, the mediator, in his role as a 
neutral, has greater discretion than an arbitrator about how to engage with 
the parties and influence the contours of the agreement the parties will reach. 
On a subtler level, the dollar amount of the funding agreement might also 
unconsciously influence both the arbitrator’s and mediator’s shaping of a fair 
and just resolution. Cognitive psychologists educate about the power of 
anchoring, the undue influence that an initial number is given in subsequent 
decision making.162 Thus, allocations of costs in arbitration and an acceptable 
settlement number might be unduly influenced by the amount of funding one 
or both parties are receiving. Might an arbitrator be influenced in making an 
award by the fact that one party has received a significant amount of backing 
by a third-party funder? Alternatively, if a defendant received a significant 
amount of backing by a third-party funder, might the arbitrator have greater 
sympathies for that defendant if the arbitrator issues an award that orders the 
defendant to pay for damages and costs? In mediation, how might the 
amount of the funding arrangements of the participants shape the mediator’s 
prodding of a reasonable settlement? 
Another yet unexplored issue is how, from the party’s perspective, a 
party receiving funding calculates settlement decisions.163 In part, the 
answer to this is likely based on the type of funding agreement that exists 
between a party and the funder. If a party has a recourse funding agreement 
in which the party is obligated to repay the funder for the borrowed money 
plus interest, it is reasonable to assume that such a financial obligation would 
be a consideration in the party assessing what a reasonable settlement would 
be. Might a party receiving an apology as part of that settlement might then 
devalue that apology if the party also has to repay the funder the borrowed 
money? Possibly, if a party has a nonrecourse loan, and doesn’t have to repay 
the funder unless the party is victorious, the party may feel more empowered 
to proceed to judgment unless the settlement offer is as high as the expected 
litigated value. 
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Of course, disputants may have their own biases about third-party funders. 
If the disputant believes that third-party funders only back cases of merit, the 
disputant may be more inclined to settle once the disputant learns that the 
other party is receiving dispute funding.164 However, if a disputant believes 
third-party funders are unethical scammers, the disputant may become less 
likely to settle and more determined to pursue her claim to vindication once 
the disputant learns the opposing side is receiving dispute funding. 
Although this is an uncharted area, these are issues that dispute resolution 
professionals should be considering as they more actively engage with 
participants and the third-party funders who back them. Of course, neutrals 
need to become self-aware of their biases about third-party funders, along 
with all their other biases, so that the bias does not adversely influence the 
dispute resolution process. Such heightened awareness extends beyond the 
initial disclosure to see if there is a conflict with the neutral. Such heightened 
awareness extends throughout the mediation and arbitration. 
B. Proposal Three: Modification of Dispute Resolution Forms and 
Procedures that Acknowledge the Possibility of Third-Party Funders 
One way to change the status quo practice of “don’t ask, don’t tell” that 
has allowed dispute resolution professionals to be unaware of the existence of 
third-party funders is to modify dispute resolution forms and procedures to 
actually ask if there is a third-party funder involved in the case. Dispute 
resolution forms and procedures should be modified to reflect an awareness 
that third-party funders may be backing one of the parties. For example, ADR 
providers’ promotional materials, published rules and procedures could 
provide that experts, including third-party funders, may have a role in the 
given dispute resolution procedure. As mentioned above, dispute resolution 
professionals may include such a query as a regular part of their intake and 
contracting procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
The invisible practice of third-party funding is becoming increasingly 
visible. The time has come for dispute resolution providers and neutrals to see 
what they have yet to see before:165 Third-party funders are shaping the 
practice of civil dispute resolution. Whether you believe this is an economic 
reality needed to address the escalating costs of conflict resolution or an evil 
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that will erode our justice system, the dispute resolution profession must take 
affirmative steps to address the real and apparent ethical collisions between 
third-party funders and neutrals. This paper proposes ethical guidelines and 
best practices that provide for modification of dispute resolution providers’ 
intake procedures, titrated disclosure of third-party funders, and training of 
neutrals. The goal is to help respond to the conflict and confidentiality 
concerns raised when third-party funders provide support for a party in 
arbitration or mediation. 
This paper also appreciates that we are in the dawn of awareness about 
third-party funders. As a profession, it is challenging to speculate about what 
we don’t know, but we must try.166 Going forward, we will benefit from 
empirical research that clarifies how third-party funding shapes parties’ 
decision-making about settlement. And of course, the looming overarching 
question is how third-party funders will influence the delivery of justice. This 
paper invites dispute resolution providers and neutrals to rethink their current 
practices, adapt, and work to create practices and guidelines that protect the 
integrity of the dispute resolution profession and the justice it provides. 
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